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ABSTRACT 
Moral Cost, Commitment, and Committee Size 
by Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad 
Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the 
profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a 
material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But 
there are also some small moral costs for those who vote in favor of default. 
We show that in such situations small committees are more likely to default 
than large committees. Thus, constituencies can decide about degrees of 
commitment by choosing committee sizes appropriately. Experimental data 
confirms our predictions. 
 
Keywords: Coordination, commitment, democracy, voting 
JEL Classification: D71, D72, H77 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Moralische Kosten, Selbstbindung und die Größe von Komitees 
Untersucht wird das Entscheidungsverhalten eines Komitees, das als politische 
Instanz mit Mehrheitsentscheidung über die mögliche Beschlagnahmung oder 
konfiskatorische Besteuerung des Anlagevermögens eines ausländischen 
Direktinvestors entscheiden kann und diesem Direktinvestor in der Vergangen-
heit vor dessen Investitionsentscheidung versprochen hatte, solche Maßnah-
men nicht zu ergreifen. Nachdem die Investition erfolgt ist, kann das Komitee 
durch das Nichteinhalten des Versprechens einen materiellen Gewinn erzielen. 
Allerdings entstehen den Befürwortern des Nichteinhaltens (geringe) morali-
sche Kosten. In diesem Zusammenhang zeigen wir, dass kleine Komitees ihr 
Versprechen mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit brechen als große Komitees. Der 
Grad der Selbstbindung des Komitees kann somit von den Wählern über die 
Größe des Komitees gesteuert werden. Wir belegen, dass die theoretischen 
Hypothesen über das Verhalten des Komitees durch Experimente bestätigt 
werden. 
 
 
1 Introduction
Niccolo Machiavelli (1531/1989 p.318) claims in the Discourses on the First
Decade of Titus Livius that democracies are more reliable in keeping promises
than dictators. In an example he refers to a situation in the 5th century BC
after the defeat of Xerxes when the population of Athens faced an interesting
opportunity. The ßeet of their allies was in a place where it could easily be
destroyed. Doing so would have established them as the dominant power
in all Greece. But while such an attack would have been very much to the
political advantage of Athens it would also have been a breach of earlier
promises. In a ballot the people of Athens rejected the proposal that was
characterized as very proÞtable, but very dishonorable. Machiavelli claims
that a dictator would have been more likely to default.1 Machiavelli does not
oﬀer a theoretical reason for this but still generalizes the idea: Democracies
should be less inclined to behave opportunistically than more centralized
governments like, for instance, dictatorships.
Machiavellis example is a case where optimal policy might suﬀer from
time-inconsistency: Ex ante, Athens may want to commit to being friendly
to their allies. However, ex post, when the chance has arisen, they may
want to default and destroy their allies ßeet. In this paper we shall oﬀer an
explanation for Machiavellis claim that democracies are less likely to default
than dictatorships.
The idea is that defaultbreach of a promise or contractmay cause
small psychological (moral) costs for those who vote for it. Indeed we shall
assume that these costs are much smaller than the economic costs or beneÞts
that are at stake. Now, consider a committee that in the past has made a
promise, say, not conÞscate the proÞts of a foreign investor. After the invest-
ment, the committee meets again and this time they vote on whether or not
to breach their promise. For each committee member the economic beneÞts
of default outweigh the small psychological costs. However, at the same time
each committee member prefers that the others will vote for the proposal to
default. We will show that, as a consequence of this, large committees are
less likely to default than small committees. Thusgiven the prevalence of
some moral sentimentsconstituencies can decide about degrees of commit-
ment by choosing committe sizes appropriately. This sheds some new light
on the role of democratic institutions for the functioning of a constituency2
1See also Cicero, De Oﬃciis, book III, chapter 11, paragraph 49 for a reference to
this event. Another early reference to this story is Plutarchs (75 A.C.E.,1998, p.99n.)
biography of Themistocles.
2In a diﬀerent framework Olson (1993) argues that the conditions that are needed for
eﬃcient economic development are the same that are needed for a lasting democracy. In
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but also the role of moral norms. In their absence commitment is much
more diﬃcult to achieve. Or, as Monoson and Loriaux (1998, p.285) put it
in their recent analysis of Thucydides History of the Peloponesian War : ...
it is precisely when the norms of moral conduct are disrupted that states and
individual Þnd it next to impossible to chart a prudent course of action.
Whether or not democracies are more able to make binding commitments
has generated much interest among political scientists. Gaubatz (1996) sur-
veys some reasons that have been suggested by political scientists why a
democracy could be more able to make binding commitments in international
relations. First, the multiple levels of democratic domestic politics may cause
inertia, and hence, a status quo bias. Second, a transition of power from one
person to another is a less drastic change in a democracy than in authori-
tarian states, and legal norms could be more important in democracies than
in authoritarian states. A third aspect is the role of audience cost that may
link domestic and international accountability. A considerable literature in
economics highlights that it could be particularly diﬃcult in a democracy
to achieve commitment, and shows that this may cause ineﬃcient policy
outcomes (see, e.g., Besley and Coate 1997, 1998). However, there are also
results suggesting that democracies are more able to commit. With hetero-
geneous preferences, supermajority rules can be used to achieve commitment
(see, e.g., Gradstein 1999, Dal Bó 2002, and Messner and Polborn 2003).
Delegation of decision making to an agent whose preferences diﬀer from the
electorates preferences and who implements a time consistent policy may
also generate commitment.3 We will put forward a reason for the ability to
commit that diﬀers from these reasons. In particular, it does not rely on
heterogeneity of voters. In fact, we will assume that all voters have identical
preferences.
In this paper we will show that there is a coordination problem in democ-
racies that can yield commitment. The coordination problem occurs even in
a democracy in which all voters have identical endowments and preferences.
some sense, his arguments can be rephrased by saying that the shadow of the future must
loom large in order to prevent those in power from ineﬃcent rent extraction.
3See, for instance, Persson and Tabellini (1994) and GarÞnkel and Lee (2000). The
modern economic literature on the eﬃciency of democracy suggests that lack of com-
mitment and discretionary time consistent decision making is a problem particularly for
democracies, compared to a stable monolithic regime. In contrast, Howitt and Wintrobe
(1995), and Wintrobe (2000) consider one of the main diﬀerences between dictatorship
and democracy that dictators have more discretion, in terms of a wider action space,
whereas democracies are often paralysed by inaction. This suggests that opportunistic
policy choices may be feasible for dictators, but not viable in a democracy. In turn, this
would imply that commitment may be feasible in a democracy whereas, in a dictatorship,
it is not.
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We Þrst consider a representative democracy in which decisions are made
by a homogenous committee. We show that the likelihood for individually
opportunistic behavior to occur increases in the number of agents that can
cast a vote (that is, the committee size). If the committee becomes suﬃ-
ciently large, and if voters cannot coordinate, the equilibria that imply the
possibility of default cease to exist. Intuitively, suppose a given percentage
of votes is needed for the desired (opportunistic) outcome. Each voter may
like the outcome, but may dislike (for many reasons) to be a voter who votes
for this outcome. In this case coordination among voters is required, and
this becomes more diﬃcult when there are many voters. This logic estab-
lishes a theoretical basis for Machiavellis claim about the superior ability of
democracies to commit on ex-post irrational outcomes.4
Having established the main theoretical result we discuss various exten-
sions and issues of robustness. Then we use experimental results obtained in
frameworks that are structurally equivalent to check the qualitative features
of our model. The evidence in these experiments is in line with our theoret-
ical predictions. We then conclude with a summary and a discussion of the
results.
2 Default in committees
Consider an agent who decides whether to make an investment in a city,
or region that is governed by a committee, for instance, a city council, or
a regional parliament. The investment is proÞtable and yields returns that
exceed the investment cost. However, the agent will make this investment
only if the share in the returns that goes to the investor is suﬃciently large.
Whether or not conÞscation of the returns takes place is a decision which is
made by a committee after the investment decision has been made.
The committee may want to promise to the investor to conÞscate only a
fraction, and to leave an amount of the returns that is suﬃcient to make the
investment just proÞtable. But there is a hold-up problem if the committee
can revise its decision after the investment has been made. The committee
may have made some promise to the investor earlier, but may now Þnd it in
the collective interest not to keep the promise and conÞscate the returns. In
this situation each committee member may face a trade-oﬀ. He prefers an
election outcome ex post that leads to conÞscation, but may feel some moral
4Our approach also does not rely on voter uncertainty about policy proposals or candi-
date quality. Fernandez and Rodrik (1993) considered how voters uncertainty about the
implications of a policy proposal causes consistency problems and shows that uncertainty
can also yield some commitment in the form of a status-quo bias.
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cost of the individual vote for conÞscation. He may prefer to vote against
conÞscation, particularly if there is still a majority voting for conÞscation.
Consider a two-stage game in which an investment can be made in the Þrst
stage. If no investment is made, the game ends. If the investment is made, a
committee decides in the second stage whether the returns are conÞscated or
not. Our analysis focuses on the committee decision in the second stage. We
assume that, if conÞscation occurs, the additionally conÞscated revenue T is
equally distributed among the set of all citizens of the region. The number
of citizens is 2n + 1 and is exogenously given here. Hence, each citizen
receives a share in the conÞscated returns equal to t = T
2n+1
if the returns
are conÞscated, and zero otherwise, where zero is just a normalization.
The committee decides by majority voting whether or not T is conÞscated.
The committee members are also citizens of the region. The committee size
can be chosen on a constitutional stage, but is exogenous once the investment
is made and when the decision has to be made whether the returns are
conÞscated or not. The committee has 2m + 1 members, where m ≤ n.
For m = 0, the committee is a president, king, or dictator. Parliaments or
councils are examples for committees with 0 < m < n. For m = n the regime
is a direct democracy. A committee member i votes for conÞscation (ζ i = 1),
or against it (ζ i = 0). All committee members vote and are not allowed to
abstain. For simplicity we consider majority voting. (Alternatives will be
brießy discussed below.) ConÞscation takes place if
P2m+1
j=1 ζj ≥ m+ 1.
Consider the committee members payoﬀs as a function of their own and
the other members decisions. The surplus from conÞscation is distributed
on a per-capita basis among all citizens. Hence, the committee members
sum of beneÞts from conÞscation (2m+1)t is proportional to the committee
size, but each committee members beneÞt is t and independent of committee
size.5
Committee members voting also involves costs. Several types of cost
could be considered. We shall assume that all committee members must
vote, i.e., we disregard transaction costs of voting. Coming back to the
investment example and the hold-up problem, conÞscation means that the
committee members voting for conÞscation do not keep their promises. This
may involve some cost to a committee member. For instance, the commit-
tee member may fear that others make inferences about how trustworthy
the member is, or about the members moral standards. Alternatively, the
committee member might have internalized some feelings of moral guilt. In
5This avoids biasing the results in favour of larger (more democratic) committees. If
the committee can appropriate a larger share of the revenue for its own members, the
results we obtain below would be strengthened.
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any case, we expect that individuals prefer voting against conÞscation if they
are not pivotal. The cost of not keeping the promise, or doing something
very dishonorable as in Machiavellis example, that is, the individual cost
of voting for conÞscation is denoted by c and the same for all committee
members. We discuss generalizations of this below. In a Þrst approach we
also assume that c is independent of committee size and discuss generaliza-
tions later. Note that this Þts well with the assumption that each committee
members beneÞt t from conÞscation does also not depend on the size of the
committee.
We can now write committee members payoﬀs as a function of the vector
of votes. A member is payoﬀ is
πi =

t if
P2m+1
j=1 ζj ≥ m+ 1 and ζ i = 0
t− c if P2m+1j=1 ζj ≥ m+ 1 and ζ i = 0
0 if
P2m+1
j=1 ζj < m+ 1 and ζ i = 0
−c if P2m+1j=1 ζj < m+ 1 and ζ i = 1
(1)
Given this payoﬀ function, we can consider voting equilibria. The follow-
ing results hold.
Proposition 1 Let m = 0 (monarchy, presidential regime or dictatorship).
There is a unique voting equilibrium with ζ1 = 1 if t > c and ζ1 = 0 if
t < c. Let m > 0. There is a (trivial) pure strategy equilibrium with ζj = 0
for all j ∈ {1, ...(2m + 1)} in which no conÞscation takes place. There are¡
2m
m+1
¢
further pure strategy equilibria if t ≥ c and no further pure strategy
equilibria otherwise. ConÞscation takes place in these equilibria and they are
characterized by
P2m+1
j=1 ζj = m+ 1.
Proof Each committee member prefers to vote against conÞscation if he
thinks that he is not pivotal and if t > c. The case m = 0 follows
immediately. For m > 0, if less than m other committee members vote
against conÞscation, member j is not pivotal and, hence, votes against
conÞscation, and so for all members. This explains the trivial equilib-
rium. We now conÞrm that any vector of votes with m + 1 votes for
conÞscation is an equilibrium if t > c. Consider i who votes against
conÞscation. Given that exactly m+ 1 other committee members vote
for conÞscation, i strictly prefers to vote against conÞscation. Consider
i who votes for conÞscation. Given that m other committee members
vote for conÞscation, i compares the payoﬀs in rows 2 and 4 in (1) and
prefers to vote for conÞscation if t ≥ c. Clearly, t ≥ c is a necessary
condition for a committee member ever to vote for conÞscation. Fi-
nally, we have to show that there are no pure strategy equilibria other
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than the ones in (i) and (ii). Suppose there are. Suppose there is an
equilibrium with r votes for conÞscation and (2m+1−r) votes against
it. If r < m+ 1, voting for conÞscation is not optimal for these r com-
mittee members. Similarly, if r > m+1, given that there is a suﬃcient
number of votes by other committee members, each committee member
prefers to vote against conÞscation. ¤
The asymmetric equilibria in which precisely m+1 members of the com-
mittee vote for conÞscation require a great amount of coordination and are,
thus, diﬃcult to achieve, particularly as each committee member prefers to
belong to the group of voters who vote against conÞscation. It is probably
more reasonable to consider symmetric equilibria. In these equilibria each
committee member randomizes and votes for conÞscation with some proba-
bility p. These symmetric equilibria are characterized by
Proposition 2 Symmetric (and un-correlated) voting equilibria in which
each committee member votes for conÞscation with the same probability are
characterized by the condition
t
µ
2m
m
¶
pm(1− p)m = c. (2)
or by p = 0.
Proof The right-hand side of condition (2) determines a committee mem-
bers cost of voting for conÞscation. The left-hand side of the condition
is the committee members beneÞt t in case of conÞscation times the
probability with which he is pivotal  that is, the probability with which
precisely m other committee members vote for conÞscation. Hence,
condition (2) is the necessary and suﬃcient indiﬀerence condition for a
fully mixed equilibrium. ¤
The results in Proposition 1 and 2 for given committee sizem resemble the
results in the literature on the problem of binary participation in the provision
of discrete public goods without refund (see, e.g., Palfrey and Rosenthal,
1984). Indeed, the voting problem considered here and this problem are
structurally equivalent; voting for the proposal has cost c and is the Þxed
positive contribution to the public good expropriation that occurs if the
number of contributions or votes establishes a majority. However, the size
of the committee is a central additional characteristic in our framework, and
we give much emphasis to the question how does committee size inßuence
the uncoordinated equilibria.
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Equation (2) may have multiple solutions for p. When facing such multi-
plicity, we select the payoﬀ dominant equilibrium. There are at most three
symmetric equilibria, the (trivial) pure-strategy equilibrium in which every-
body votes against conÞscation, and the two mixed equilibria when (2) has
two real-valued solutions. Payoﬀs in the symmetric pure-strategy equilib-
rium are zero. Players payoﬀs in any symmetric mixed-strategy equilib-
rium can be easily calculated by taking the expected payoﬀ of voting against
conÞscation. Voting against conÞscation gives t times the probability that
conÞscation takes place if all mix according to the equilibrium probability.
Hence, the payoﬀ-dominant symmetric equilibrium is given by the largest
real-valued p solving (2) and, if there is no real-valued solution, by p = 0.
We deÞne this payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium as p∗(m).6
The probability with which the conÞscation takes place is, thus, given by
P (m) ≡ 1−
mX
i=0
µ
2m+ 1
i
¶
p∗(m)i(1− p∗(m))2m+1−i. (3)
The approval probability P (m) is equal to the probability with which all
but i members of the committee vote for conÞscation, with i ≤ m. Now,¡
2m+1
i
¢
p∗(m)i(1−p∗(m))2m+1−i is the probability with which precisely i mem-
bers of the committee vote for conÞscation, and these probabilities are summed
up and deducted from the total probability to obtain P (m).
The comparative statics of the equilibrium probabilities p and P with
respect to the size of the committee reveal whether conÞscation becomes
more or less likely as the committee size changes. The following holds:
Proposition 3 The payoﬀ-dominant symmetric equilibrium probability p∗(m)
is a (weakly) decreasing function in the committee size m. There is a critical
Þnite m0 at which p∗(m) ≥ 1/2 for all m < m0, and p∗(m) = 0 for m ≥ m0.
The approval probability P (m) = 0 for m ≥ m0.
Proof Let p = p∗(m+1) be the payoﬀ dominant equilibrium with committee
size 2m+ 3 which is determined by
c
t
=
µ
2(m+ 1)
m+ 1
¶
pm+1(1− p)m+1 (4)
6We may also consider a change in c and how it aﬀects this equilibrium conÞscation
probability. If the cost of voting for conÞscation becomes smaller, this increases p∗ as
t
¡
2m
m
¢
in (2) does not depend on c, and pm(1− p)m is decreasing in p for p > 1/2. Hence,
in the limit, for c→ 0, the mixed strategy equilibrium converges toward p = 1 for a Þnite
committee size m.
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and ep = p∗(m) be the payoﬀ dominant equilibrium with committee size
2m+ 1 that is determined by
c
t
=
µ
2m
m
¶epm(1− ep)m. (5)
Note thatµ
2(m+ 1)
m+ 1
¶
pm+1(1−p)m+1 = 2(2m+ 1)
m+ 1
p(1−p)
µ
2m
m
¶
pm(1−p)m. (6)
As 2(2m+1)
m+1
p(1− p) < 1 for all p ∈ (0, 1), this implies p(1− p) > ep(1−ep).
This, together with ep, p ≥ 1/2 implies ep ≥ p . This establishes the Þrst
claim. For the second claim, notice that c
t
is a constant whereas the
term
¡
2m
m
¢
increases by a factor 2+ 2 m
m+1
, when increasing m to m+1.
The Binomial distribution converges to the normal distribution, and
the probability that a voter is pivotal converges towards zero, even if
p = 1/2. The critical m0 is characterized by the Þrst m for which
(2m)!
m!m!
1
22m
<
c
t
. (7)
Hence, for suﬃciently large m, p = 0 becomes the only equilibrium
solution. In turn, p(m) = 0 implies P (m) = 0. ¤
The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows. In a mixed strategy equi-
librium, the expected beneÞt of voting for the collectively prefered outcome
must just compensate for the individual sacriÞce of voting for this outcome.
If the committee becomes larger, for given probabilities of voting for the col-
lectively prefered outcome, each members chance of being pivotal is reduced,
and this reduces a voters expected beneÞt of voting for the collectively pref-
ered outcome. To counterbalance this eﬀect all other voters probability of
voting favorably must be reduced, as this increases the probability of being
pivotal. However, there is a limit for this counterbalancing eﬀect at p = 1/2.
The mixed strategy equilibrium disappears when a further adjustment of p
that could cause indiﬀerence for each player ceases to exist.
Let us illustrate this with a numerical example. Figure 1 shows the two
fully mixed equilibria for t = 1 and various values of c ranging from 0.005 to
0.32 as a function of (logarithmic) committee sizes. With small committees
(k < 2, m < 8) the equilibrium probability p(m) in the payoﬀ-dominant
equilibrium is very large. Then, this probability slowly decreases until it
has reached roughly 1/2. If committees get larger, the fully mixed equilib-
rium suddenly disappears and the unique voting equilibrium is the one where
8
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Figure 1: Equilibrium values of p(m) for t = 1 and cost ranging from c =
0.005 (curve to the right side) to c = 0.32 (curve to the left side), where
k = ln(m).
everybody votes against conÞscation. For c = 0.005 this is true already for
the smallest committee of size 3, while for c = 0.32 a committee size of 2900
is needed to make the mixed strategy equilibrium disappear.
Coming back to the problem of an investor who is concerned about the
committees incentives to conÞscate all returns, the hold-up problem is re-
duced the lower P (m) is, and vanishes if the number of committee members
becomes suﬃciently large. The limit result in Proposition 3 shows that a
suﬃciently large size of the committee is suﬃcient to eliminate the threat of
conÞscation. It would be interesting to show that P (m) is also monotonically
decreasing in m in the range m < m0.
This holds if
Pm
i=0(
(2m+1)!
i!(2m+1−i)!
³
(2m+3)(2m+2)
(2m+3−i)(2m+2−i)q
i(1− q)2m+3−i − pi(1− p)2m+1−i
´
+
¡
2m+3
m+1
¢
qm+1(1− q)m+2 > 0
(8)
where p = p(m) as in (2) and q = p(m + 1). As 1/2 < q < p, the left-hand
side is larger than
Z ≡ (1− p)m+1Pmi=0[ (2m+1)!i!(2m+1−i)!pi(1− p)m−i
×
³
(2m+3)(2m+2)
(2m+3−i)(2m+2−i)(1− p)2 − 1
´
]
+
¡
2m+3
m+1
¢
pm+1(1− p).
(9)
This, in turn, can be solved numerically for a large range of m and p.
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Figure 2: The value of Z as a function of p and m. (Notice that we re-
stricted the plot such that only non-negative values of Z are displayed. The
monotonicity of P (m) thus follows by the observation that there is a Z-value
for each point in the entire pm plane.)
Figure 2 shows the numerical values of this term, suggesting that P (m)
is, indeed, monotononically decreasing in m.
3 Robustness
Some assumptions made in the previous section should be discussed.
Asymmetric cost. It was assumed that all members of the committee are
homogenous. They have the same voting costs and the same beneÞts from a
particular voting outcome. This assumtion was not only for simplicity, but
also to higlight the fact that the results established here do not require het-
erogeneity of voters. However, it could be interesting to consider asymmetric
cost and to conÞrm that the same type of mixed strategy equilibrium exists
under asymmetric cost. Committee members may diﬀer with respect to their
cost, for instance, 0 ≤ c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ c2m+1. This could be due to diﬀerences
in their psychology, or in diﬀerences in their constraints that may determine
these costs. For instance, investment in a reputation could be more valuable
for committee members at the beginning of their career than for members
at the end of their career etc. Such diﬀerences make it easier for the com-
mittee to coordinate, for instance, on one of the asymmetric pure-strategy
equilibria, for example, the one in which the m+1 committee members who
have the lowest cost vote for the proposal. However, even with asymmetric
cost, it is still true that each voter prefers the outcome in which he votes
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against the proposal, but at least m + 1 other voters vote for the proposal,
and this leads to similar mixed strategy equilibria as above, and to a similar
limit result for large committees as in Proposition 3.
Other types of cost. As has been discussed above, committee members
may feel other types of cost of voting for a particular policy as well. For
instance, they may feel particularly miserable if they are pivotal and if their
vote caused a particular outcome. Let this cost be d. Accordingly, the mixed
strategy equilibria are characterized by the condition
t
µ
2m
m
¶
pm(1− p)m = c+ d
µ
2m
m
¶
pm(1− p)m. (10)
The left-hand side of (10) is the expected beneÞt of voting for the proposal.
The right-hand side consists of the moral cost of voting for the proposal,
and the expected cost of being pivotal and causing the acceptance of the
proposal. As can be seen by comparing condition 10) with (2), not much
changes as long as c < t− d.
Further types of cost or beneÞts may also exist and have been discussed
in the context of the framework of private (threshold) provision of a public
good as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984). For instance, Güth and Nitzan
(1997) draw attention on the possibility of a moral cost or a pleasure of
free-riding that a player feels if and only if the public good is successfully
provided, and consider the evolutionary stability of this cost or beneÞt in
large populations, focussing on pure strategy equilibria. Further, the cost of
voting for conÞscation could be larger or smaller, depending on whether a
voter is pivotal or not.
Our main result will typically not change if these additional types of cost
exist: large committees face a major coordination problem and the mixed
strategy equilibrium that does not require coordination will typically disap-
pear if the committee becomes suﬃciently large if committee members feel
some own cost of voting for the collectively desirable outcome.
QualiÞed majorities. In Section 2 simple majority voting was considered.
The results do not change qualitatively if a proposal must win more or less
than half of the votes for being accepted, except for a unanimity rule. In the
extreme case of an unanimity rule, there are at most two equilibria: the trivial
equilibrium in which all voters reject the proposal and unanimous approval.7
7Under unanimity every player can veto a proposal. In some cases majority rules are
combined with giving veto power to some players. For a theoretical treatment of voting
in the presence of veto players see, for example, Winter (1996); for some empirical results
Tsebelis (1999). In our model all players would vote against a proposal if one veto player
does.
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Endogenous cost. The cost of voting for the proposal may depend on the
committee size. If c = c(m), a suﬃcient condition for the limiting result in
Proposition 3 is that c(m) ≥ ε > 0 for all m ≥ m1 for some m1. In this case
ε replaces c in the proof of the limiting result.
Endogenous committees. Members of committees are often chosen, for
instance, by appointment or election. As the voting outcome of the com-
mittee depends on its size m and the committee members cost c, the se-
lection of committee members is decisive for the voting outcome. If a con-
stituency would like to commit itself Þrmly (to induce an ex ante optimal
time-inconsistent policy), it can install a committee a suﬃciently large com-
mittee. If the constituency wants to keep an investor just happy (to solve a
hold-up problem), it can choose a somewhat smaller committee size induc-
ing a P (m) that leaves just enough expected rent for the investor to invest.
Finally, if the consitituency wants full ßexibility and is willing to sacriÞce ex
ante optimal strategies, it can install very small committees or even appoint
a single decision maker.
One may also consider self-selection of representatives of the constituency
for the committee of a pre-determined size m. One should expect that voters
with small c self-select into committees as they have low cost of serving on
the committee.
4 Experimental evidence
We are not aware of any direct experimental tests of our above model. How-
ever, as discussed above, the second stage of the investment and voting game
is equivalent to a game with private (threshold) provision of a public good
(Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984). Several data sets that exist on this equivalent
problem allow us to draw some inference about the empirical relevance of our
theoretical results. The structural equivalence is not complete, however, par-
ticularly if one considers the various additional types of psychological costs
and beneÞts in the voting game and in the standard step-level public goods
game. As discussed, in the voting game, one may expect additional psycho-
logical cost from being pivotal if one votes for conÞscation, whereas the public
goods literature discusses the opposite type of psychological eﬀects, gener-
ally expecting that contributors feel a warm glow from contributing, and a
particularly high warm glow in case a contributor is pivotal (see Oﬀerman,
Sonnemans and Schram 1996).
Let us neglect these psychology diﬀerences, and consider the bare bones
of a step-level public-good game with M players. Each player has to decide
between two alternatives: whether to contribute a Þxed amount C to a public
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good, or to contribute zero. If the number of contributors reaches or exceeds
a given number Q, the public good can and will be provided. The public
good generates a beneÞt equal to t to all players. If Q or less individuals
decide to contribute, the public good is not provided. The cost C is sunk and
not refundable for each player, regardless of other players contributions, and
whether the number of contributions is suﬃcient for provision of the public
good. This game is equivalent to the one discussed above, with C replacing
c, M replacing 2m + 1, and t being the individual beneÞt from successful
provision of the public good.
Experimental evidence on this step-level public goods game supports the
idea of coordination failure. Van de Kragt, Orbell and Dawes (1983), for in-
stance, considered binary contribution threshold experiments. In their games
each player in a group of 7 players decides whether to make a contribution of a
pre-determined size, or not to contribute to a public good. The contributions
are not refunded, regardless of how many players contributed. The public
good is provided if at least Q players contribute, and the individual beneÞts
from this public good are independent of the number of contributions, pro-
vided this number is at least Q. They consider Q = 3 and Q = 5. They Þnd
that even small groups of seven players frequently fail to coordinate if they
are not allowed to communicate. With Q = 3, optimal provision occured
in 45 percent of the experiments. The good was not provided in 27 percent
of all cases and overprovision occured also in 27 percent of all cases. With
Q = 5, the rate of optimal provision was 22 percent, whereas overprovision
and underprovision occured with equal frequency of 39 percent.
Croson and Marks (2000) survey threshold public good games and esti-
mate the success rate (equivalent to the P (m) from above) as a function of
the number of players (in our model M = 2m + 1) and the step return of
the game, where the latter is deÞned in our model as s = (2m+1)t
(m+1)c
, i.e., the
ratio between the aggregate beneÞts from provision of the public good and
the aggregate cost that accrue if the good is provided eﬃciently. They Þnd
the following relationship:8
P (n, s) = −4.4 + .12× s− .09×M. (11)
Expressing s and M in terms of the variables of our models (m, t, and c) we
8We take the results from the regression (shown in their Table 2), plugging in the
implicitly assumed values of the dummy variables included in their regression.
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can rewrite (11) as
P (m, c, t) = −4.4 + .12(2m+ 1)t
(m+ 1)c
− .09(2m+ 1) (12)
= −5.3− 1.8m+ .12(2m+ 1)t
(m+ 1)c
.
While it seems not particularly reasonable to compare the exact quanti-
tative predictions of this linear model (that was estimated for small groups
of players) with our theoretical predictions that hold for arbitrary numbers
of players, it is important to notice that the qualitative predictions of our
model are conÞrmed. The conÞscation probability is decreasing in the com-
mittee size, increasing in the ratio the material beneÞts t and decreasing in
the psychological costs c. Moreover, the coeﬃcients estimated by Croson
and Marks are all signiÞcant, so that these qualitative Þndings appear to be
reliable.
5 Conclusion
We show that committee sizes determine degrees of commitment. Small
committees are more likely to default on earlier promises than large ones.
Suﬃcently large committees can perfectly commit to ex ante optimal but
time-inconsistent policies. But constituencies might also choose a committee
size that induces a probabality between 0 and 1 for default. This may be
optimal to resolve hold-up problems. Facing a certain probability of default
a (foreign) investor might just decide to invest because his expected returns
are slightly bigger than his costs. Thus, medium sized committees might be
able to extract (in expectation) the full rent from foreign investments.
The implications of these results are potentially far reaching. The prop-
erty rights issue is one of the most important problems in political economy.
And it is perhaps not by co-incidence that the prototype country of direct
democracy, Switzerland, has been considered one of the safest places to store
money on secret bank accounts, and one of the countries with the lowest
tax rates on capital returns. The coordination problem in democracies that
reduces the scope and the probability for eﬀective opportunistic default may
contribute to an explanation for this evidence.
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